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Abstract
It is generally presumed that strengthening the enforcement of lender rights expands the
set of incentive compatible loan contracts, resulting in increased access to credit for all types
of borrowers. This is based on an implicit assumption of innitely elastic supply of loans.
With inelastic supply, strengthening enforcement can result in greater exclusion of poor
borrowers from credit markets and a reallocation of credit from poor to wealthy borrowers.
Using a dataset of capital project loans given by a large Indian bank to rms of varying
asset sizes, we nd evidence of such adverse distributional impacts of a reform to strengthen
lender rights implemented across Indian states in the 1990s.
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It is commonly believed that weak enforcement of credit contracts adversely aects the function-
ing of credit markets. If borrower liabilities in the event of default are not eectively enforced,
borrowers cannot credibly commit to repay their loans. As a consequence, lender risks are high
and borrowers are confronted ex ante with a high cost of credit, which lowers their access to credit
and reduces the volume of loans. Stronger enforcement lowers the cost of credit and increases
access. In contract-theory parlance, it enlarges the set of incentive-compatible credit contracts,
allowing the utility possibility frontier to move outwards.
Some empirical evidence supports this hypothesis. In cross-country studies, La Porta et al.
(1997, 1998) show that weak investor protection is correlated with thinner debt markets. Gropp
et al. (1997) nd that higher exemption limits for consumer bankruptcy across dierent US states
were associated with greater exclusion of poor borrowers. Visaria (2007) uses a micro-panel of
loans to assess the impact of debt recovery tribunals (DRTs) set up in dierent Indian states at
varying dates in the 1990s. She nds that stricter enforcement of lender's rights in the event of
default signicantly improved repayment behavior, and subsequently lowered interest rates on
new loans.
Similar arguments have been used more broadly for enforcing well-dened property rights.
For example, it has been argued that awarding land titles to squatters in Peru allows borrowers
to pledge property as collateral, increasing their access to credit (De Soto, Field 2007).
This paper argues that the traditional presumption may need to be qualied considerably:
the eects of stronger enforcement of property rights are more nuanced. First, at a theoretical
level we shall argue that with realistic forms of borrower heterogeneity, stronger enforcement of
property rights have ambiguous eects. In particular, it can have adverse distributional impacts,
and they do not always constitute a Pareto improvement. The redistributive eects arise due
to a general equilibrium (GE) eect of the reform that has been overlooked by the conventional
argument based entirely on partial equilibrium (PE) reasoning.
Second, we conduct an empirical analysis of the eect of a legal reform in India studied
previously in Visaria (2007), focusing particularly on the distributive impacts on access and
cost of credit for borrowers of varying size. In this reform, new specialized courts called debt
2recovery tribunals were set up to reduce delays in debt recovery suits. Visaria (2007) shows
suggestive evidence that they eectively lowered case processing times and thus increased the
amount recovered by banks from defaulting loans. In this paper we show that the reform had
adverse distributional impacts, consistent with the GE eects postulated by our theoretical model.
In our sample consisting of rms borrowing from a leading private sector bank in India to nance
capital construction projects, we nd that the bottom three quartiles of rms (in terms of asset
size) experienced a signicant reduction in their access to credit: the probability of getting a new
loan as well as average loan size for the bottom three quartiles fell after DRTs were established.
These results are robust to controls for national level time trends in credit volume as well as
time-invariant state and industry-specic unobservable characteristics.
The GE eect can be explained as follows. Improving the enforcement of credit contracts
enlarges the set of incentive compatible debt contracts, thus shifting outwards the incentive-
constrained demand function for credit. This increases the equilibrium prot rate earned by
lenders, which subsequently raises the cost of credit. This GE eect causes a reduction in credit
granted, osetting the original, partial equilibrium (PE) eect of superior enforcement. The PE
eect is (proportionately) greater for wealthier borrowers, while the GE eect aects all borrowers
uniformly. Hence the poorest borrowers may experience increased cost of credit, and lose credit
access. Wealthier borrowers experience larger PE eects, which overwhelm the GE eect, thus
enlarging their access to credit. Hence the enforcement reforms can result in a redistribution of
credit.
In a competitive credit market, the extent to which this redistribution occurs depends on the
elasticity of supply of loans. If the supply is perfectly elastic, the prot rate is unaected, and
there is no GE eect. In that case there is a Pareto improvement, with an improvement in credit
access for all borrowers. The traditional presumption is set in this context. On the other hand, if
credit supply is suciently inelastic, the GE eect becomes more powerful, implying a regressive
redistribution in access to credit. As a result, the aggregate eciency impacts of the reform are
ambiguous. If the marginal productivity of loans is higher for poorer borrowers, then a decrease
in their access to credit will lower eciency. Clearly, the overall impact is an empirical matter:
it depends on the supply elasticity of loans, in combination with the wealth distribution among
borrowers and properties of the technology. Our empirical analysis conrms that such an adverse
3distributional impact characterized the Indian DRT reform in the 1990s.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the relation of this paper to existing
literature. Section 3 develops the theoretical model. Section 4 describes the Indian DRT reform
and the project-loan database we use to construct our borrower-quarter panel data. Section 5
presents the empirical results. In section 6 we consider an alternative theoretical explanation of
the empirical ndings, and attempt to use the empirical ndings to dierentiate between the two
explanations. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
In this paper, the main forces are based on the tension between partial and general equilibrium
eects. This is modeled in a similar fashion to the Walrasian characterization of contracts in
stable matching of lenders and borrowers outlined in von Lilienfeld-Toal and Mookherjee (2007).
There, loans were subject to ex ante moral hazard in addition to the possibility of voluntary
default, and the focus was on the eects of reform in personal bankruptcy law (e.g. changes in
borrower exemption limits). Instead, this paper focuses on a reform which strengthened the legal
enforcement of lender rights, the 1993 Indian law establishing debt recovery tribunals. The two
types of reforms have quite distinct distributional impacts: a lowering of exemption limits results
in an equal absolute increase in borrower liability, whereas strengthening enforcement results in
a higher increase in liability for wealthier borrowers. The lowered exemption limit therefore tends
to increase credit access for poor borrowers relative to wealthier borrowers, whereas we argue
here that the DRT reform could lower relative credit access for the poor.
Biasi and Mariotti (2006) also model the general equilibrium eects of changes in rm
bankruptcy law. However, they assume a xed project size, thus ruling out the possibility of
redistribution of credit. Instead, our paper delivers and empirically tests predictions of credit
redistribution. However, their and our models generate similar implications for redistribution of
rents, for essentially similar reasons.
Visaria (2007) empirically investigates the impact of the DRT reform in India, using the same
database of project loans made by a large Indian bank. In contrast to the eects of the reform
on repayment behavior and interest rates on the average loan studied in that paper, this paper
4focuses on credit redistribution across borrowers of dierent asset sizes. Nevertheless, as will
become clear later, we draw upon some of her results to justify our empirical analysis and argue
that the eects are identied.
In our primary model, in the absence of any GE eects, strengthening contract enforcement
induces credit expansion and payo improvement for all borrowers. This result depends critically
on contractual completeness, i.e., the assumption that borrower liabilities can be specied to be
fully state-contingent in advance. With incomplete contracts, defaults arise in equilibrium and
strengthening lender protection may result in payo losses and credit contraction for risk-averse
borrowers. We show in Section 6 that this is an alternative explanation for our empirical ndings
on credit allocation. This argument is related to the explanation provided informally by Gropp
et al. (1997) for their nding that higher bankruptcy exemption limits across US states were
associated with a credit redistribution from poor to wealthier borrowers. The empirical analysis
in this paper has the advantage of using a panel data set rather than relying on a single cross-
section. Also, the staggered, exogenous introduction of DRT across Indian states allows the clean
identication of the eects of changing liability rules.
3 Model
Consider an economy populated by risk neutral borrowers, dierentiated by (collaterizable) xed
assets W, distributed according to cdf G over support [
;  
]. Each borrower seeks to invest in a
project at scale   0. A project of scale  requires upfront investments of I. It generates returns
of y  f(), where y 2 fys;yfg is a borrower-specic productivity shock, and f is an increasing,
continuously dierentiable, S-shaped function with
f()
 rising until b and falling thereafter, for
some b  0. Hence f0() is rising over some initial range (0;b0) and falling thereafter, where b0 < b.
We assume the borrower does not have any liquid wealth to pay for the upfront investments. In
contrast to von Lilienfeld-Toal and Mookherjee (2007), we simplify by abstracting from project
moral hazard: the probability of success (y = ys) is given and denoted e. It is useful to introduce
 y  e  ys + (1   e)  yf.
53.1 Complete Contracts
A loan contract stipulates the amount borrowed ( I), and the amount Tk to be repaid in state
k 2 fs;fg. We say contracts are complete (CC) if the repayment obligation Tk can vary with the
state k 2 fs;fg. Otherwise they are said to be incomplete. In this section we focus on complete
contracts; a later section considers the case of incomplete contracts.
Each borrower may decide to default on the loan ex post. Should a borrower default, lenders
can seize the fraction  of ex post assets owned by the borrower. Ex post assets equal W + yk 
f(). Here, 1    is the fraction of rm's returns diverted by the entrepreneur. We shall treat 
as a parameter and assume that  < I=( y  f0(b0)). This limits the extent to which the returns
from the project itself can serve as a signicant source of collateral; the borrower's assets remain
the primary source of collateral.
We are interested in the enforcement of credit contracts should the borrower default. The
enforcement institution is represented by , incorporating delays and/or uncertainties in the
collection process. Enforcement is aected by judicial reforms such as DRT. The main focus is
thus on the eects of raising .
Should the entrepreneur repay his loan, he obtains ex-post utility W +yk f() Tk in state
k 2 fs;fg. In contrast, utility in case of default in state k 2 fs;fg is given as (1   )  [W +  
yk  f()] + (1   )  yk  f()   d where d is an additional default cost incurred by the borrower
(reputation loss, legal costs etc). The entrepreneur will not default in state k if and only if
Tk  [W +   ykf()] + d: (ICk)
It is a standard result that with complete contracting there cannot be any default in an
optimal contract: any contract that induces default will be dominated by another which lowers
the repayment obligation in the default state to avoid default and its attendant deadweight losses.
3.2 Supply
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> > > :
a +   ; if   ;
0; else,
where  is the return per rupee loaned, and   0;a  0;  0. The linearity of the supply curve
is for expositional convenience alone; our results carry over to any upward sloping supply curve.4
To avoid a vacuous analysis, assume that  y  f(b)=b > I(1 + ), i.e. some projects will be funded
in the absence of any enforcement problems.
 = 1 corresponds to the case of a perfectly elastic supply of funds: in that case the equi-
librium rate of prot is xed at . And the supply is completely inelastic (above prot rate )
if  = 0. The elasticity of the supply of funds will play a key role in our analysis, which we will
treat as an empirical matter. From one perspective, globalized nancial markets guarantee an
innitely elastic supply of capital to any given economy and hence  = 1. We shall refer to this
case as involving no GE eects. An alternative view emphasizes the role of `local knowledge' and
`monitoring loans' matter for nancial intermediaries, which are in restricted supply. In that case
 < 1: nancial markets are not perfectly integrated, and enforcement reforms will entail GE
eects that operate through the eect on the equilibrium prot rate.
It should be noted that the credit market is only one example where general equilibrium
eects may play a role. Conceivably, the rm needs to use some (other) input factors to produce
output, for example labor (this framing is used in Biais and Mariotti (2006)). Then, our results
carry over if there are GE eects in the labor market. In that case, reforming credit enforcement
would have spill-overs to the labor market. The implications for credit redistribution would be
similar to our set-up.
3.3 Demand
As a benchmark, we start with the rst-best demand F() which solves
4The following microfoundation of credit supply can be given. A given lender incurs loan monitoring (screen-
ing/collection) costs of c per rupee loaned, which has to be subtracted from the gross rate of return  on loans
to obtain the net prot. Each lender is capacity constrained and a lender with monitoring cost c has capacity to
lend upto L(c). Monitoring costs are distributed according to a given distribution H(:) over c. Hence, if the going





[ yf()   I(1 + )]; (FB)
with  y  eys + (1   e)yf.
The rst-best is not always implementable due to the no-default incentive constraint (IC).
The relevant demand thus takes these constraints into account:
Denition 1 In a -incentive compatible loan contract, each borrower i with assets W demands
credit i(W;;) which solves
max
;Ts;Tf
e[ysf() + W   Ts] + (1   e)[yff() + W   Tf]
subject to
Tk  [W + ykf()] + d;k = s;f (IC)
and
eTs + (1   e)Tf  I(1 + ) (PC)
Aggregate incentive compatible demand for credit is then given as   Ld(;) =
P
i i(W;;).
Adding up the IC and PC constraints, it becomes clear that a project size  is implementable
if and only if
[W +  yf()] + d  I(1 + ): (IC0)
Condition (IC') reduces to the existence of a credit ceiling. To see this note that it can be rewritten
as
:W + d  I(1 + )   : yf(): (IC00)
The assumption that  < I=( yf0(b0)) implies that the right-hand-side of (IC") is increasing in
project scale . In other words, since the returns on the project do not serve as a substantial source
of collateral (owing to the low value of ), larger project scales are more dicult to implement. A
borrower with given wealth W will face a credit ceiling uniquely dened by the value of  which
solves the equality version of (IC"). We shall denote this project scale ceiling by H
i (W;;). It
is increasing in W;, and decreasing in .
To characterize the optimal demand for credit, the following denitions are useful:
8Denition 2 First best asset threshold: WF()  fI(1 + )   dg=    yf(F):
Maximum project size: H
i (W;;) which solves [W +  yf()] + d = I(1 + )
Minimum project size: L() is the smallest solution to  y  f()= = I  (1 + )
Minimum viable asset threshold: WL(;) solves H
i (W;;) = L().
At a given prot rate , it is clear that a rm will operate and gain access to a loan only if
its maximum project size H
i exceeds the minimum viable project scale L. This translates into
a wealth threshold WL below which borrowers are excluded from the credit market altogether.
Those above WL will operate at a scale given by the smaller of the rst-best scale and its ceiling
H
i . This translates into the rst best asset threshold WF. Hence those between WL and WF
obtain a loan but are rationed with regard to the scale of the loan, while those above WF are
not rationed.
Of course this is at a given prot rate , so it does not yet describe the equilibrium credit
allocation, which requires us to determine the equilibrium prot rate. Accordingly the preceding
discussion pertains to the incentive-constrained demand function for loans:
Lemma 3 The incentive-constrained demand function for credit is
i(W;;) =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
0; if W < WL(;);
H
i (W;;); if WL(;) < W < W F();
F(); if W > W F().
3.4 Market Equilibrium
We consider a competitive market for loan contracts and use a standard Walrasian equilibrium
notion, where the prot rate is determined by the equality of aggregated supply and incentive-
constrained demand:
Denition 4 An incentive-constrained Walrasian allocation is a credit allocation in which each
borrower receives his incentive-constrained demand corresponding to a prot rate , which has
the property that supply of loans at  equals incentive-constrained demand at  aggregating
across all borrowers.
9It can be shown (along the lines of Lilienfeld-Toal and Mookherjee (2007)) that Walrasian
allocations characterize stable allocations of a matching market between borrowers and lenders,
under suitable assumptions on the distribution of lenders. 5
Since market demand changes with , the equilibrium prot rate  will be a function of 
and denoted by () where required.
3.5 Eects of Increasing  with No GE Eects
Consider rst the case where there are no GE eects:  = 1. Then the equilibrium prot rate is
xed at , and the equilibrium credit allocation is given by borrower demands evaluated at the
prot rate .
In this case the eect of raising  is straightforward: see Figure 1. Incentive constraints are
relaxed, permitting an expansion of credit ceilings for every borrower. The proportion of rms
excluded from the market must fall, as the minimum project scale does not change with . Bor-
rowers that were previously credit-constrained will obtain larger loans, and thus attain higher
payos. Those that were not constrained will be unaected, and the same is true for lenders. The
result is a Pareto improvement, and a favorable distributional impact as poorer borrowers gain
access to credit. Borrowers are better o because every contract implementable under weak en-
forcement is also implementable under strong enforcement. 6 This is the basis of the conventional
intuition concerning the benets of strengthening enforcement institutions.
5Specically, a sucient condition is the Competitive Supply Assumption, which states that for any lender
with cost c and lending capacity L(c), there exists other borrowers with cost at or below c with aggregate lending
capacity of at least L(c). An example of a situation where this holds is that there exist at least two lenders of
any given `type'. Under this assumption, the gross rate of return  on lending must be equalized across all active
lenders, owing to a Bertrand-like competition among lenders.
6It should be noted that this is a pretty general result. In particular, even if Tk cannot be conditioned on k
because the state k is costly to verify, it will still be true in a costly state verication problem. This result has the
logic of a mechanism design problem, where a higher  relaxes incentive constraints. On the other hand, however,
the result does not apply if contracts are incomplete and payments cannot vary for exogenous reasons.
10- -
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Figure 1: Impact of changing liability law absent GE eects.
3.6 Eects of Increasing  with GE Eects
Now consider the case where the supply of funds is not perfectly elastic. An increase in  will
shift the aggregate credit demand function outwards, and thus raise the equilibrium prot rate.
This GE eect will choke o some demand, in order to clear the credit market. The total eect on
credit allocation will now be composed of a PE eect (which relaxes credit ceilings at any given
prot rate), and a GE eect which involves a rise in the prot rate that shrinks credit ceilings,
raises the minimum viable project scale, and lowers the rst-best project scale.
As a rst step, we consider the case where the supply of funds is `nearly' perfectly elastic, so
the GE eect is suciently weak:
Proposition 5 Consider an increase in  from  to   > . Then for  nite but suciently
large:
1. the proportion of rms excluded from the market falls (i.e., the minimum asset threshold
WL falls)
2. the rst-best project scale (and hence credit allocated to suciently wealthy borrowers) falls,
and
113. for borrowers with intermediate asset sizes the credit allocated rises.
Proof. The argument is based on noting that the increase in the equilibrium prot rate can
be made arbitrarily small if  is suciently large. This implies the result since a suciently small
rise in the prot rate will imply that the project ceiling H will rise (by at least a certain amount)
for all borrowers owing to the given rise in , while the rise in the minimum viable project scale L
will be small enough. Hence the expansion of the credit ceiling (for borrowers near the minimum
asset threshold WL) will outweigh the increase in the minimum viable project scale, resulting in
a reduction of exclusion, and an increase in credit ceiling for all active borrowers. However, the
rst-best project scale will decline owing to the rise in the prot rate.
We construct an upper bound for the rise in the equilibrium prot rate ( ) () and then
argue that this upper bound becomes arbitrarily small as  increases. If  > 0, L 1
s () exists, i.e. Ls
is invertible and let   = L 1
s (Ld(1;0)). Here, Ld(1;0) is an upper bound for credit demand (with
 = 1 and  = 0). Note that    ( ) and () > a. Then   is decreasing in  and approaches a
as  becomes large. As a result,    a converges to zero for large  and since    a > ( ) (),
( )   () also approaches zero for large . Hence, for large enough , ( )   () is arbitrarily
small.
The eects of an increase of  in the case of nearly-perfectly elastic supply of loans is similar
to the case where GE eects are totally absent. Yet there are some important dierences. There
is a distributional shift of credit in favor of poorer borrowers, away from wealthy borrowers. The
eect is not a Pareto improvement: the wealthiest borrowers are worse o owing to the rise in the
prot rate. On the other hand, the borrowers at the bottom end of the asset distribution that
gain access to the market are made better o. For intermediate sized borrowers, the eects are
ambiguous: their credit limits are relaxed and so they can expand the scale of their projects. On
the other hand, they pay higher interest rates.
Now turn to the other extreme where the supply of funds is perfectly inelastic ( = 0). To
obtain sharp results, we focus on the case where  = 0: only the borrowers initial assets serve as
collateral. Also we assume that the upper bound of the wealth distribution is low enough that no





12Suppose  rises to 0 and suppose the corresponding equilibrium prot rate rises from  to 0.
Then note that if the project ceiling does not fall for some borrower with wealth W:
(W)  H(W;0;0)   H(W;;)  0
then it must rise (and will be bigger) for all higher wealth borrowers with higher wealth W0 > W,
i.e., (W0) > (W)  0.7
Now it must be the case that the proportion of borrowers that are excluded must rise. Oth-
erwise the minimum asset threshold WL remains the same or it falls. Since the minimum viable
scale has risen, it must be the case that a borrower at the previous minimum threshold WL must
have experienced a rise in the project ceiling. This implies that all borrowers must also experience
a rise in their ceilings. Since (by assumption) there is no borrower wealthy enough to achieve the
rst-best scale, the credit allocated to every active borrower must have risen. This contradicts
the fact that the supply of funds is perfectly inelastic.
Hence there must be a rise in the incidence of exclusion at the bottom end of the asset
distribution, and those borrowers must be worse o. Since the aggregate supply of funds is
xed, there must exist wealthier borrowers who receive a larger supply of funds. Indeed, the
above argument shows that there must exist a cuto wealth level ^ W whose credit allocation is
unaected, above which credit expands, and below which credit contracts. So there must be a
regressive redistribution of credit across borrowers.
We summarize the preceding discussion as follows.
Proposition 6 With CC and GE, suppose  
 < W((1)),  = 0, and supply is perfectly inelastic
( = 0). If  increases, the prot rate and the proportion of borrowers excluded rises. Moreover,
there exists threshold asset size ^ W such that:
(a) If W < ^ W, credit falls, and the borrower is worse o
(b) If W > ^ W, credit rises.
We now have a regressive redistribution of credit among the set of credit-constrained borrow-
ers. The intuition underlying this result is depicted in Figure 2. On the right side of the gure,
7This follows since (W) = W[ 0
I(1+0)   
I(1+)] + d[ 1
I(1+0)   1
I(1+)]. Since 0 > , we have d[ 1
I(1+0)  
1
I(1+)] < 0. So (W)  0 implies 0
I(1+0)   
I(1+) > 0, and then the result follows.
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Figure 2: Impact of changing liability law with GE eects.
we see that aggregate demand increases which implies an increase in the equilibrium prot rate
. However, rms with dierent assets are dierently aected, which is mirrored in the left side
of gure 2. The leftmost demand function corresponds to a rm with the smallest possible assets,
i.e., W = 0. For a rm with zero assets, changing  does not lead to a change in the demand for
credit. Hence, the same function represents demand for credit, both before and after the reform.
In contrast to this, individual demand for rms with W > 0 shifts outward. The middle and
rightward demand functions in the left side of gure 2 represent incentive compatible demand for
the same rm with assets W > 0 both, before and after the change of . Demand prior to the
change corresponds to the demand function in the middle of the left side of gure 2. This demand
function is then shifted outward to the rightmost demand function in the left side of gure 2.
This asymmetric eect has the following implication for changes in equilibrium demand: The
rm with W = 0 cannot benet from the increase in  and its demand curve is not shifted
outward. At the same time, the rm now faces a higher prot rate. As a result, its demand for
credit decreases from 
1 to 
2.
The rm with W > 0 does benet from the increase in . As a consequence, it's demand
curve is shifted outward. It also faces a higher interest rate which potentially reduces demand.
14However, the outward shift of the demand curve dominates the prot rate eect and demand
increases from  1 to  2. Hence, small rms demand less credit, large rms get more credit due to
the change in .
Our results are summarized in gure 3. Panel A depicts the redistributive eect of increasing
 absent any (GE) eects. Then,  incentive compatible demand shifts outward for all borrowers
who operate at their credit ceiling. Some excluded borrowers can now also participate and exclu-
sion is reduced. For suciently small (GE) eects, all credit constrained borrowers receive more
credit: exclusion is reduced and the credit ceiling is shifted outward. In contrast to this, those
who work at the rst best project scale reduce demand for credit since credit has become more
expensive. For suciently strong (GE) eects, the eects become more ambiguous. Exclusion
may increase. Moreover, smaller rms get less credit and medium sized rms get more credit.
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Figure 3: Impact of changing liability law with GE eects.
Predictions for interest rates are also worth noting. If we interpret the interest rate to corre-









The interest rate rises for poor borrowers for whom  falls.8 The change in the interest rate is
ambiguous for others whose project scale expands.
8This is because the minimum viable project must be below b, where the average return to the project scale
f()
 is maximized. Hence
f()
 must be locally rising in . The rest follows from the fact that  rises.
154 Context for Empirical Work: DRT Reform
In 1993, the Indian government passed a national law establishing new specialized tribunals for
debt recovery. Before these tribunals, civil courts were responsible for trying all debt recovery
suits. There, they were processed according to the Code for Civil Procedure, and it was extremely
common for cases to continue for extremely long. Nearly 40% of the pending debt recovery cases in
civil courts in 1985-86 had been pending for longer than 8 years (Law Commission of India 1988).
Instead, DRTs follow a new streamlined procedure. Defendants are given less time to respond
to summonses, they must provided a written defense, and they can only make counter-claims
against the bank at the rst hearing. DRTs are also authorized to make interim orders to prevent
defendants from disposing o their assets before the case is closed, and in some circumstances
may also issue a warrant for the defendant's arrest. Substantive laws governing the cases did
not change. Suggestive evidence in Visaria (2007) shows that DRTs eectively reduced the time
taken to process cases, and thus may have increased the (present discounted) value of the amount
recovered from defaulting loans. Therefore, we interpret the introduction of a DRT in a state as
an increase in the parameter  from our model.
Although the DRT law allowed for tribunals to be set up across the entire country, in practice
there were signicant delays in the establishment of DRTs across dierent states. Although the
rst DRT was set up in 1994, the introduction was not complete until 1999. Visaria (2007) argues
that legal hurdles and questions about the constitutional validity of the DRT law were primarily
responsible for these delays. She also empirically investigates the relationship between state-level
economic, judicial and political variables and the pattern of DRT incidence. She is unable to
reject the hypotheses that these variables did not aect the timing of DRT establishment. We
therefore rely on the exogeneity of DRT establishment to argue that we have identied the causal
eects of stronger lender rights on credit allocation and interest rates for borrowers.
Note that the DRT law only applies to debt recovery claims larger than Rupees 1 million.
Claim size is related the size of overdues on a loan and therefore depends not only on the size
of the loan but also on past repayment. However, to the loans larger than Rupees 1 million are
more likely to also generate overdues larger than Rupees 1 million, we should expect that very
small loans would be less likely to fall under the purview of DRTs. We will show later that 90
percent of the loans in this sample are larger than this threshold, and therefore can potentially be
16exposed to DRTs. Importantly, we nd no signicant dierences in the DRT eect on repayment
behavior for borrowers of dierent asset sizes. Therefore, we proceed on the assumption that DRT
establishment increased the value of  for all borrowers by the same amount.
4.1 Data
Since DRTs operate at the state-level,  is determined at the state-quarter level. We use data
on the timeline of DRT establishment across states to determine which borrower-quarters are
exposed to DRTs.
We use data on credit contracts collected from a large private bank's project loan database.
In addition to basic borrower-level characteristics, this database contains detailed information
on the interest rate charged, loan duration, and project location for each project loan given by
this bank until the date of data collection in June 2003.9 We use this to construct a balanced
borrower-level panel dataset for the period 1982-2002. Since DRTs were established during the
period 1994-1999, this gives us three years of data where no states had DRTs, six years where
DRTs were being established in dierent states in dierent years, and three years of data where
all states had DRTs. A borrower exists in the data set if it received a loan in any quarter between
1982 and 2002.
Unfortunately, we do not observe loan applications. Therefore, we are unable to separate lack
of access to credit from a lack of demand for credit. If we do not observe any new loan given
to a borrower in a given quarter, we set new credit received by this borrower in this quarter to
zero. Since large project loans are not taken that frequently, less than 10 percent of the borrower-
quarter pairs are associated with a new loan.
The database does not report the date when the rm was established or date when it closed.
Therefore we cannot ascertain if a particular borrowing rm existed before it received the rst
loan in the database or after it received the last loan in the database.10 We proceed on the
assumption that a rm does not exist before it receives its rst loan, and that once it enters the
9Note, there is some censoring of data due to a change in the database system in 2001. As a result, all loans
which were no longer active (i.e. all repayment was complete) at the time of the switch were dropped from the
database. It is therefore possible that the older loans we observe are better at repayment than the true distribution.
10In future work, we hope to match this database to a database from another source where we can observe the
date of rm establishment.
17dataset it continues to exist.
From our theory, it becomes clear that asset size of the borrowing rm may aect the impact
of DRT. However, there is a potential endogeneity problem of asset size. Firms which receive
credit are more likely to become large or continue to remain large rms in the future. We address
this problem by using two dierent versions of historical asset size. In the rst version, we use
asset size lagged four quarters back. However, given the long time period in our data, even this
measure of asset size can be aected by DRT. In other words, for an observation that occurs 5
quarters after the DRT was introduced, the asset size lagged four quarters is still endogenous to
the DRT. Another problem is that there are many years where asset data for a given borrower is
missing.
In order to address both these problems, we use a second measure of asset size. Asset size
is measured in the rst quarter the borrower received a loan, and this value is held constant
throughout the sample. We drop the rst-quarter observation from the regression. This mitigates
missing data problems substantially. With borrower xed eects, this second version utilizes only
pre-DRT asset size measures, thus addressing potential endogeneity of asset size. With borrower
xed eects, however, we miss possible eects of DRT on entry of new borrowers. A potential
problem here is that this asset size measure could be from many years ago and could therefore
be a poor proxy of current asset size.
Descriptive statistics are shown in table 0A and 0B, also broken down by quartiles of rms
assets. As discussed before, if credit is positive, more than 90 percent of all loans given out
were above 1 million rupees. Small rms receive considerably smaller credit (Rs. 30.7 million) as
compared to large rms (Rs. 270 million). Furthermore, interest rates were on average 15 percent
with little variation across rms of dierent size, with the exception of the largest rms who paid
somewhat smaller interest rates (14.4 percent). Also, the loan contracts are long term and last
more than six years on average.
4.2 Empirical specication
Our empirical analysis is based on a dierences-in-dierence strategy, which relies on the staggered
introduction of DRTs across states. Thus, suppose that a DRT was introduced in state i in year
t, when state j had still not received a DRT. Our empirical strategy then estimates the dierence
18between the change in credit volume (or credit access or interest rates) between year t   1 and t
in state i with the same change in state j. The dierence is attributed to the DRT.
The eects are identied if DRT introduction across states was not correlated with unobserved
state-level changes in credit access, credit volume and interest rates. As discussed earlier, Visaria
(2007) argues persuasively that DRT introduction was inuenced by legal hurdles and debate
rather than state-level factors.
Accordingly, we run the following regressions.




(Djt  sizei) + statej + quartert + industryi + :
The rst dependent variable is yijt dened as total new credit received by borrower i located in
state j in quarter t. We also run regressions for access to credit, and average interest rate (on all
new credit received by the borrower in that quarter).
Here, Djt is the DRT dummy for state j in quarter t, Djt = 1 if state j has introduced DRT
by quarter t and zero otherwise. Our denition of borrower location is inuenced by the DRT
law's stipulation of a tribunal's territorial jurisdiction. According to the law, a claim can be led
against a borrower either in the state where the defendant resides, or in the state where the cause
of action arose. In our data, this can be interpreted as either the state where the borrowing rm's
head quarters are located, or the state where the project is located. In our sample, 25 percent
of borrowers have projects in multiple states, and this phenomenon is concentrated among the
larger rms. Project sites may themselves be endogenously chosen in response to DRTs, and so
we assign borrower location on the basis of the rm's head quarters.
Our theory predicts dierential eects for borrowers of dierent sizes, and therefore we use
categorical variables for asset size to test the hypotheses. Size classes sizei are dened on the
basis of the xed assets of rm i in a previous quarter t0. We run two dierent specications for
size class measures: above or below the median, or four classes, using quartiles as the thresholds.
The interaction of asset size categories with the DRT dummy pick up the dierential DRT eects
by borrower size class.
In all regressions, we include quarter xed eects to control for national-level time trends in
the dependent variable. State xed eects control for observable and unobservable time-invariant
state-specic economic, social or political conditions that may inuence credit contracts. Similarly,
19industry xed eects control for any industry-specic factors that could cause credit volumes to
be larger or smaller, or interest rates to dier (say, due to industry-specic risk factors).
We run dierent sets of regressions, all in two varieties: First, we run regressions on the
pooled cross-section of observations, while including industry, state and quarter xed eects.
Second, we run borrower xed eect regressions to control for time-invariant unobserved borrower
characteristics that may confound the results. In each regression, we correct for serially correlated
errors by clustering standard errors at the state-quarter level, and at the borrower level separately.
We estimate two additional regressions. In one, the endogenous variable is rijt and is dened
as the average interest rate that borrower i located in state j pays for loans received in quarter t.
We also run a logit for credit exclusion, i.e. whether or not a borrower received credit in a given
quarter. The endogenous variable is then ^ yijt = 1; if yijt > 0 and ^ yijt = 0 if yijt = 0. For both
rijt and ^ yijt, we use the same set of explanatory variables and also run the regressions with our
two datasets (one year lagged assets vs. assets from rst observation). Note that ^ yijt is estimated
using logit and conditional logit models.
5 Empirical results
We discuss our empirical results along the lines of proposition 6.
Reduced credit for small rms Table 1A and 1B report the results of estimating the
redistributive impact of DRT introduction with respect to total credit received. It turns out
that small rms receive signicantly less credit due to DRT. The impact can be seen in all eight
dierent regressions we run and all but one (table 1A, quartiles) are statistically signicant. These
eight regressions are the result of the dierent combinations of OLS regressions vs. borrower xed
eects regressions, using median vs. quartiles as asset size classes and using dataset 1 (lagged
asset data) and dataset 2 (historical asset data from rst observation).
The negative impact is economically highly signicant and dier depending on the dataset we
use. The results from dataset 1 with lagged asset data suggest that for rms with assets below
the median, credit shrinks by Rs. 4 Mi. (average credit is Rs. 9.5 Mi.). Results for the same rms
using dataset 2 (historical asset data from rst observation) imply a reduction of approx. Rs. 2
Mi. (average credit is Rs. 5.5 Mi.). Regressions using quartile classes deliver similar results. One
20interesting aspect of the quartile regressions is that the lowest 3 asset size classes are facing a
reduction in credit received.
Increased exclusion for small rms
Tables 3A and 3B report results of logit regressions for the variable credit positive which is
one if credit is positive and zero otherwise. Corresponding to the pooled OLS regressions, we run
a simple logit regression using state, quarter and industry xed eects; again for dataset 1 and
dataset 2. The results indicate that small rms are more often excluded once DRT is introduced.
In contrast to the amount of credit received, the coecients are not always signicant even though
always negative.
Increased credit for large rms
Proposition 6 predicts that rms with large enough asset size (though below WF) receive
more credit due to DRT. This prediction is not supported in the regressions using two asset size
classes above/below the median. Note that the results presented report the overall eect on large
rms (i.e. 1 + 3).
This missing increase in credit received for large rms may be due to the wrong cutos for
asset size. Indeed, the three lowest asset size quartiles have less credit due to DRT. Moreover, rms
from the highest asset quartile indeed receive more credit in the regressions using quartile classes.
Note that the results are not always signicant and for the borrower xed eects regressions only
hold at the 10% level in one regression.
Reduced exclusion for large rms
Similar to credit received, exclusion is not reduced in regressions using two asset size classes
above/below the median. With four quartile classes, large rms tend to receive credit more
often and these results are signicant in the logit regressions. Conditional logit regressions with
borrower xed eects are only signicant if dataset 2 is used.
Eects on interest rates
The interest rates regressions as reported in table 2A and 2B again suggest that large and
small rms were dierently aected by DRT. Small rms pay higher interest rates due to DRT
in the OLS regressions. However, using borrower xed eects, this increase in the interest rate is
not statistically signicant from zero. Interest rates for large rms do not increase (the coecient
is negative but not statistically dierent from zero).
21The eects on the interest rate may be due to general equilibrium eects as proposed in
proposition 6. However, we have to be careful with this interpretation since the impact in the
borrower xed eects regressions is not statistically dierent from zero. An alternative explanation
may be that the introduction of DRT allows more risky rms to enter the market. The increased
interest rate would then reect the dierent risk characteristics of these rms. Unfortunately, we
cannot further dierentiate on this dimension.
6 Incomplete Contracts: An Alternative Explanation?
We now wish to explore the question of the channels by which the adverse impact on credit access
for small borrowers may have resulted. In this section we present an alternative explanation based
on incomplete contracting, which may potentially also explain this result. Subsequently we try
to examine contrasting predictions of the two theories and assess their relative empirical validity.
The incomplete contract channel we develop here borrows ideas from Gropp et al (1997) and
Bolton and Rosenthal (2002), who stress an insurance value to borrowers of weak enforcement.11
The main idea is the following. If the debt contract is not state-contingent, rms may default
in equilibrium following adverse shocks. The likelihood of such default and the related deadweight
losses of default is greater for smaller rms. As a result, smaller rms decide to borrow less when
there is stronger enforcement of credit contracts. The stronger enforcement of credit contracts
increases the burden of default costs that has to be borne by the rm. A weaker bankruptcy law
then serves as an insurance device against adverse shocks since defaulting borrowers are punished
less harshly.
We now formalize this argument in the context of a variation on the model studied in section
3. Consider a version of that model with  > 0. The most important departures are:
1. Contracts are incomplete: Ts = Tf  T.
2. No GE eect: the prot rate is xed  = .
3.  > e
11This aspect of bankruptcy law is stressed in several other contributions, e.g. Livshits et al. (2007) or Chatterjee
et al. (2007).
224. yf = 0.
5. The production function is concave: b = 0
The last two assumptions simplify the exposition substantially. We discuss the role of this
assumption in due course. We abstract from GE eects in order to separate the story based
on incomplete contracts from the story based on GE eects. Note that an incomplete contract
cannot be state-contingent for exogenous reasons.
In an incomplete contract, default in state k occurs if T > [W +ykf()]+d. This gives rise
to two possible kind of contracts:
1. Safe contract: The rm never defaults: T  W + d
2. Default contract: The rm defaults only in state f and hence T 2 (W + d;fW + ysf()g + d]
We rst derive the optimal safe contract: S maximizes f() y   I(1 + ), subject to  
W+d
I(1+). If the rm is credit constrained (i.e., if the rst best contract cannot be implemented
using a safe contract), S = W+d
I(1+). Hence, the optimal safe contract does not dier from the
optimal complete contract.
Next, consider the optimal default contract. For similar reasons as in the GE model, the PC
constraint is always binding. Hence, T = I(1+). The no-default in state s constraint implies
that T  [W + ysf()] + d. These constraints together imply
 
[W + ysf()] + d
I(1 + )
Note that the scale restriction in the default contract does not bind, because  > e. To see
this, note that the rst-best scale maximizes  y  f()     I  (1 + ). With  > e, the LHS of
the ICf increases by more than the RHS of the ICf constraint, since  > e. Hence D = F,
independent of ;W.
Lemma 7 There exists an asset size ~ W such that:
1. All borrowers with W  ~ W choose the safe contract.
2. All borrowers with W < ~ W choose the default contract.
23The reasoning is based on comparing borrower's payos between the best safe and default
contracts. In the best safe contract, the borrower's payo is f(S) y   S  I(1 + ) + W: In the
best default contract it is: f(F) y  F I(1+) (1 e)d+W. Hence the borrower prefers the
safe contract if
(1   e)d > f(D) y   D  I(1 + )   ff(S) y   S  I(1 + )g
The drawback of the default contract is the default cost (1 e)d, which is independent of W.
The benets of using the safe contract is that it allows a higher project scale. However, S is
increasing in W and the dierence between D(= F) and S is decreasing in W. As a result, for
a rm with project scale S suciently close to F, the benets of the default contract are too
small to outweigh the costs and this rm (and all rms with higher W) choose the safe contract.
We can now state the main result of the incomplete contracting model:
Proposition 8 Consider an improvement of contract enforcement (from  to  ). Then, there
exist asset sizes W0 < W00 < W000 such that:
1. Credit for all rms with W < W 0 remains unchanged.
2. Credit for all rms with W 2 [W0;W00] decreases.
3. Credit for all rms with W > W 000 (weakly) increases.
As  rises, the scale of the safe contract expands. This motivates borrowers of intermediate
wealth to switch to the safe contract: as a result their borrowing falls. Poor borrowers are unaf-
fected because their safe contract is still too restrictive in project size, so they do not switch to
the safe contract. In contrast, wealthy borrowers who already employ the safe contract expand
their project scale, since the latter is increasing in .
Note that if borrowers are risk-neutral the payo eects are similar to that of the complete
contracts in the absence of any GE eects. Increasing  then constitutes a Pareto improvement.
If borrowers are risk-averse then default is a source of insurance for small borrowers, which gets
reduced as  rises. In this case small borrowers may become worse-o, and a Pareto improvement
no longer results.
24Are there any predictions of the incomplete contract model which contrast with those of the











Note that the interest rate is decreasing in , since stronger enforcement motivates a switch
towards the safe contract. In contrast the complete contract model predicts a rise in the interest
rate for small borrowers, resulting from a rise in the equilibrium prot rate and the shrinkage in
project scale.
Unfortunately, the empirical results do not enable us to dierentiate between the two theories
on this basis. There is a tendency for interest rates for small borrowers to rise (consistent only
with GE eect). However, the rise is not statistically signicant in the borrower xed eect
regressions; it is signicant in the pooled OLS regressions.
7 Conclusion and Future Directions
We have documented a puzzling eect of contraction of credit volume (and higher cost) for small
borrowers following a credit enforcement reform in India. We provide two possible explanations
for this shrinkage of credit: GE eects in a complete contract model, and default-avoidance in
an incomplete contract model. The empirical results do not clearly discriminate in favor of one
hypothesis over another. It is also conceivable that both GE eects and default-avoidance were
operative.
The empirical and theoretical results cast doubt on the general presumption that strengthen-
ing lender collection rights or expanded scope for collateral will relax credit market imperfections
for most borrowers, or that aggregate eciency/output will rise. While lenders are generally bet-
ter o due to an increase in credit enforcement, borrowers may be worse o. Our empirical results
suggest that three quarters of all borrowers experienced reduced access to credit as a result of the
reform. Hence, there may be substantial political obstacles and economic losses resulting from
strengthening enforcement of credit contracts.
In future research, we plan to investigate possible cross-state spillovers of the DRT reform.
This is another way of examining the role of GE eects in explaining the eects of the reform. It
25is also interesting in its own right, examining the extent to which capital ows across states can
be explained by institutional reforms in credit enforcement.
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27Table 0A: Summary Statistics
Whole sample Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
Average asset size ('10millions) 167.53 5.85 17.16 45.96 570.26
(850.89) (2.67) (4.37) (14.93) (1589.07)
Fraction observations where credit received (%) 7.89 6.10 6.71 8.38 10.14
(26.96) (23.93) (25.03) (27.71) (30.18)
Fraction observations where credit above 1 million 97.09 94.25 96.53 97.90 98.34
(16.82) (23.29) (18.31) (14.35) (12.79)
Average volume of credit ('10millions) 0.95 0.19 0.21 0.45 2.81
(9.74) (8.00) (1.56) (2.65) (16.97)
Volume of credit if positive ('10m) 12.06 3.07 3.12 5.36 27.77
(32.71) (32.25) (5.22) (7.58) (46.37)
Average duration of loan (days) 1868.62 1969.40 1924.48 1842.96 1799.43
(1145.98) (923.68) (968.61) (1132.78) (1344.74)
Average interest rate (%) 15.21 15.38 15.96 15.55 14.40
(4.40) (4.80) (4.06) (4.14) (4.45)
N 65228 15688 15876 16468 17196
Note: Standard deviation in parentheses.
Lagged Asset dataTable 0B: Summary Statistics
Whole sample Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
Asset size ('10millions) 51.77 1.90 5.50 11.90 185.40
(485.07) (0.92) (1.29) (2.90) (951.70)
Fraction obs where credit received (%) 4.91 4.37 4.33 4.88 6.06
(21.62) (20.44) (20.35) (21.54) (23.85)
Fraction obs where credit above 1 million 94.51 94.09 92.07 94.65 96.42
(22.71) (23.58) (27.03) (22.51) (18.59)
Volume of credit ('10millions) 0.55 0.24 0.35 0.40 1.22
(7.94) (6.19) (7.57) (5.06) (11.38)
Volume of credit if positive ('10m) 11.28 5.41 8.12 8.18 20.08
(34.09) (29.14) (35.50) (21.49) (41.96)
Duration of loan (days) 1892.68 1852.50 1865.50 1912.90 1923.57
(1158.55) (1026.68) (1026.68) (1191.89) (1276.01))
Interest rate (%) 15.06 15.77 15.14 15.15 14.44
(4.58) (4.69) (4.60) (4.38) (4.56)
N 143936 35270 35829 36408 36429
Note: Standard deviation in parentheses.
Historical asset data from first observationTable 1A Own state DRT Effect
Dependent variable: Volume of credit, Lagged Asset data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DRT Effect on Small -0.563 -0.441
0.000 *** 0.002 ***
0.000 *** 0.000 ***
DRT Effect on Large 0.071 -0.152
0.642 0.362
0.728 0.457
DRT Effect on Quartile 1 -0.274 -0.359
0.241 0.192
0.190 0.007 ***
DRT Effect on Quartile 2 -0.596 -0.543
0.000 *** 0.000 ***
0.001 *** 0.000 ***
DRT Effect on Quartile 3 -0.674 -0.558
0.000 *** 0.000 ***
0.001 *** 0.001 ***
DRT Effect on Quartile 4 0.612 0.282
0.030 * 0.284
0.071 * 0.321
Fixed effects I, S, Q I, S, Q Q Q
N 65228 65228 65228 65228
Note: First row = p value for state x quarter clustering, Second row = p value for borrower clustering.
OLS Borrower Fixed EffectsTable 1B Own state DRT Effect
Dependent variable: Volume of credit, Historical Asset data from first observation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DRT Effect on Small -0.225 -0.226
0.005 *** 0.005 ***
0.020 ** 0.024 **
DRT Effect on Large 0.028 0.006
0.686 0.941
0.774 0.954
DRT Effect on Quartile 1 -0.330 -0.346
0.002 *** 0.001 ***
0.010 *** 0.005
DRT Effect on Quartile 2 -0.120 -0.106
0.119 0.298
0.296 0.460
DRT Effect on Quartile 3 -0.199 -0.244
0.001 *** 0.000 ***
0.035 ** 0.017 **
DRT Effect on Quartile 4 0.256 0.253
0.037 * 0.076 *
0.103 0.124
Fixed effects I, S, Q I, S, Q Q Q
N 143936 143936 143936 143936
Note: First row = p value for state x quarter clustering, Second row = p value for borrower clustering.
OLS Borrower Fixed EffectsTable 2A Own state DRT Effect
Dependent variable: Interest rate, Lagged Asset data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DRT Effect on Small 0.758 0.327
0.012 ** 0.261
0.025 ** 0.396
DRT Effect on Large 0.237 0.031
0.395 0.898
0.434 0.917
DRT Effect on Quartile 1 0.98 0.283
0.021 ** 0.567
0.047 ** 0.64
DRT Effect on Quartile 2 1.43 0.401
0.267 0.214
0.311 0.348
DRT Effect on Quartile 3 0.916 0.254
0.378 0.35
0.485 0.463
DRT Effect on Quartile 4 -0.082 -0.145
0.284 0.597
0.301 0.656
Fixed effects I, S, Q I, S, Q Q Q
N 5146 5146 5146 5146
Note: First row = p value for state x quarter clustering, Second row = p value for borrower clustering.
OLS Borrower Fixed EffectsTable 2B Own state DRT Effect
Dependent variable: Interest rate, Historical Asset data from first observation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DRT Effect on Small 0.41 0.007
0.115 0.98
0.161 0.983
DRT Effect on Large 0.114 -0.093
0.646 0.654
0.679 0.748
DRT Effect on Quartile 1 0.704 0.218
0.013 ** 0.43
0.036 ** 0.554
DRT Effect on Quartile 2 0.468 -0.217
0.903 0.567
0.909 0.634
DRT Effect on Quartile 3 0.421 -0.033
0.266 0.91
0.33 0.929
DRT Effect on Quartile 4 -0.168 -0.143
0.962 0.553
0.966 0.664
Fixed effects I, S, Q I, S, Q Q Q
N 7073 7073 7073 7073
Note: First row = p value for state x quarter clustering, Second row = p value for borrower clustering.
OLS Borrower Fixed EffectsTable 3A Own State DRT Effect
Dependent variable: Credit positive, Lagged Asset data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DRT Effect on Small -0.209 -0.106
0.029 ** 0.505
0.033 ** 0.321
DRT Effect on Large 0.063 0.056
0.307 0.449
0.411 0.499
DRT Effect on Quartile 1 -0.043 -0.101
0.771 0.671
0.755 0.521
DRT Effect on Quartile 2 -0.336 -0.109
0.001 *** 0.454
0.002 *** 0.355
DRT Effect on Quartile 3 -0.057 0.050
0.470 0.609
0.569 0.630
DRT Effect on Quartile 4 0.173 0.061
0.023 ** 0.498
0.057 * 0.515
Fixed effects I, S, Q I, S, Q Q Q
N 65228 65228 65228 65228
Note: First row = p value for state x quarter clustering, Second row = p value for borrower clustering.
Logit Conditional LogitTable 3A Own State DRT Effect
Dependent variable: Credit positive, Historical Asset data from first observation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DRT Effect on Small -0.174 -0.141
0.023 ** 0.328
0.029 ** 0.095
DRT Effect on Large 0.011 0.021
0.858 0.819
0.867 0.768
DRT Effect on Quartile 1 -0.069 -0.022
0.515 0.892
0.490 0.834
DRT Effect on Quartile 2 -0.270 -0.257 **
0.429 0.144
0.007 *** 0.017
DRT Effect on Quartile 3 -0.157 -0.159
0.167 0.214
0.097 * 0.106
DRT Effect on Quartile 4 0.141 0.163
0.017 ** 0.046 **
0.088 * 0.056 *
Fixed effects I, S, Q I, S, Q Q Q
N 14396 14396 14396 14396
Note: First row = p value for state x quarter clustering, Second row = p value for borrower clustering.
Logit Conditional Logit